We provide a qualitative analysis of resistance to calls for gender-neutral language. We analyzed more than 900 comments responding to two essays—one on AlterNet and another on Vox posted to the Vox editor’s Facebook page—that critiqued a pervasive male-based generic, “you guys.” Five rhetorics of resistance are discussed: appeals to origins, appeals to linguistic authority, appeals to aesthetics, appeals to intentionality and inclusivity, and appeals to women and feminist authorities. These rhetorics justified “you guys” as a nonsexist term, thereby allowing (...) commenters to continue using it without compromising their moral identities as liberals or feminists. In addition to resisting an analysis that linked their use of “you guys” to social harms, commenters positioned the authors who called for true generics as unreasonable, divisive, and authoritarian. We conclude with suggestions for how feminists can challenge the status quo and promote social change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peirce on Realism and Idealism by Robert LaneAaron B. WilsonPeirce on Realism and Idealism Robert Lane. Cambridge UP, 2018.Robert Lane's Peirce on Realism and Idealism is the ultimate secondary source for those who wish to engage the forms of realism and idealism that Peirce develops over the course of his writings. Lane could not have given his monograph a more concise and descriptive title. He never strays from (...) the topics of realism and idealism, and it is remarkably complete. It includes extensive discussion on Peirce's basic realism (Lane's term) as well as his extreme scholastic realism (Peirce's term), his basic idealism (Lane's term), and his objective idealism (Peirce's term). It might not be the best resource for those interested in the historical influences on Peirce's forms of realism and idealism. For instance, if one is interested mainly in Peirce's extreme scholastic realism and its roots in scholastic philosophy, Mayorga (2007)1 might still be a more useful resource. Also, Lane leaves much to be said about the epistemological underpinnings of Peirce's forms of realism and idealism. Peirce's theory of perception and his critical common-sensism do not get much attention. Also, there is much in Peirce's later semeiotic writings that could have been brought to bear on the issues.However, I do not see any of these omissions as failures of Lane's work. As I read it, the book's central aims are to determine the following: (1) what metaphysical views did Peirce hold, (2) when did he hold them, (3) are they consistent with one another, and (4) what is the textual evidence that he held them as such. With respect to these aims, Peirce on Realism and Idealism exhibits the gold standard of Peirce scholarship: it is remarkably sensitive to dates, different writings, and contexts of writings, and the reader gets a strong impression that Lane has not left any stone unturned—that he had at least skimmed every word in every lecture, published writing, letter, and unpublished manuscript that Peirce produced.Although the book contains some interpretations about which I have some reservations, which I describe further on, I agree with most of its central claims. This includes the claim that, despite various developments, Peirce had always subscribed to "basic realism": the thesis that there are things independent of what anyone thinks about them. A whole chapter is dedicated to showing that Peirce's 1868–1869 "anti-Cartesian" papers are consistent with basic realism, and I found that chapter very helpful. Another thesis that Lane defends, and that I strongly agree with, is that Peirce held a representationalist view of truth. Truth as "correspondence" with reality is one of two [End Page 107] key aspects of Peirce's account of truth (the other being, as Lane calls it, an "investigative aspect"). After works by Christopher Hookway, Cheryl Misak, and others that attempt to de-emphasize or obscure Peirce's representationalism, perhaps to make him more appealing to contemporary analytic "neopragmatists," it is absolutely refreshing to read a book that embraces Peirce's representationalism without apology.However, in the remainder of this review, I will focus on parts that I found troubling. Some of this trouble is probably due more to Peirce himself than to Lane's interpretation of Peirce. But some of it directly concerns Lane's interpretation. In particular, the parts of chapter 6 concerning Peirce's modal realism, while stimulating and enlightening, are also problematic. Further, I do not think that Lane's account of Peirce's idealism appropriately recognizes its similarity to Hegelian or Absolute idealism.To begin with Peirce's modal realism, Lane's discussion of it sets out by addressing the fact that, as Peirce recognizes, the conditionals comprising "pragmatic clarifications," or what result from applying the "pragmatic maxim" to a concept, must be in the hypothetical or subjunctive mood. This is in order to make sense of the truth of even indicative non-conditional propositions such as, to use Peirce's and Lane's example, "the diamond is hard." If the conditionals into which a concept is pragmatically clarified are in the indicative mood... (shrink)

This article formulates a new approach to combating corruption in Uganda. In pursuit of this research, the author highlights the chronicity of corruption in Uganda, which is uniformly political and bureaucratic. Bureaucratic corruption takes place in service delivery and rule enforcement. It has two sides: demand-induced and supply-induced. Political corruption occurs at high levels of politics. There are 'political untouchables' and businessmen who are above the law and above institutional control mechanisms. The established institutions of checks and balances in Uganda (...) have assiduously continued to have a limited bearing on corruption. Neither coherent anti-corruption norms nor severe formal sanctions are able to dishearten certain politicians and civil servants in Uganda from the deviant behaviour of structural corruption. Corruption is a spiritual departure from the law and standard of God. It is an action conceived in the human mind and carried out by the corrupt. Therefore, corruption deterrence not only lies in sound public financial management systems but depends to a large extent on having people with positive human character in all aspects of national life. This article thus provides the framework of corruption and discusses the manifestation of political and bureaucratic corruption in Uganda. It also exegetes the biblical stance regarding corruption. Finally, it proposes a panacea for combating political and bureaucratic corruption. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers by Richard AtkinsAaron B. WilsonBy Richard Atkins Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. 352 pp. (incl. index).With his third book on Peirce in fewer than eight years, Richard Atkins has quickly established himself as a scholar who contributes high-quality, focused, and detailed accounts of diverse areas of Peirce's thought. (...) His first book on Peirce, Peirce and the Conduct of Life (2016), focuses on ethics and religion, while the focus of his second, Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology (2018), is evident from the title. Now, Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers (2023) is a detailed analysis of key parts of Peirce's logic—mainly the part of logic he called Critic, "which classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind" (EP 2:260). Perhaps what is remarkable is that none of Atkins's three books on Peirce are directly about pragmatism or pragmaticism. Of course, connections abound, but had Atkins chosen instead to write books on Peirce on meaning, on truth, on inquiry, or even on reality, pragmatism would have occupied a more central place in them. He has articles relating to these topics, and perhaps his fourth book on Peirce will put pragmatism in center, but I find it invigorating that someone has done as much justice to the richness of Peirce's philosophical thought outside pragmatism or pragmaticism as Atkins has done.The layout of Peirce on Inference is very straightforward. First, how should we understand the nature of inference and arguments in general, according to Peirce; second, how does Peirce go about classifying inferences into main types; and third, how does Peirce understand the nature and the validity of each main type of inference. [End Page 234]In the first part, Atkins cannot avoid addressing one of the major controversies of Peirce's philosophy: his simultaneous rejection of psychologism in logic and his endorsement of apparent psychological explanations of logical matters. On this issue, Atkins's response is basically correct, and it might be the most lucid correct response I have seen. I will comment more on it further on. I will, then, comment on the classification issue, particularly as it concerns abduction. For the sake of space, I will say very little about Atkins's accounts of Peircean deduction and induction. I found the parts on deduction very informative, though that could be attributed to my own lack of focus on deduction in Peirce. The parts on induction, easily the basic type of inference to which Atkins gives the most attention, are philosophically rich. He includes a chapter on objections and replies to Peirce's account of induction and its validity, ranging from circularity objections to underdetermination objections, to Goodman's famous "grue" problem, and here Atkins is careful to distinguish between Peirce's replies and Peircean replies. As there is too much to comment on here, I will put aside induction in the remainder of my review, remarking only that Atkin's book is a must read for anyone wanting to engage Peirce on induction. Instead, I focus on the psychologism issue and on what Atkins says about Peirce on abduction.1. PsychologismAtkins distinguishes between inference and argument in Peirce, taking inference to be "a category of mental action" while taking argument to be "a category of semiotic relations" (8). Thus, according to (Atkins's) Peirce, logic is "a science of thought insofar as it studies the process of inferring" (ibid.). Some might regard this already to be too psychological a reading of Peirce's logic. But it is well supported by Peirce's texts, and Atkins argues that it does not undermine Peirce's "unpsychological view of logic" (9). The reason it doesn't is simple: while logic is a science of thought so far as it studies inference as a mental process, the "broader target is the sorts of inferences that could be made and how far they are good" (9). That is, "Peirce's theory is unpsychological because the logician takes an interest in all the sorts... (shrink)

Idealist and Strong Empiricist approaches to Peirce’s thought are irreconcilable so far as an Idealist interpretation commits Peirce to some form of a priori knowledge, particularly a priori knowledge of the conditions of empirical knowledge. However, while I favor the strong empiricist approach, I agree that there is something like a “condition for the possibility of empirical knowledge” in Peirce, and that this lies with his famous conjecture that, with enough time and experience, there would be a “final result” of (...) all inquiry – “the Final Opinion.” Though some argue that this is mainly a regulative assumption or intellectual hope in Peirce, I contend that he is committed to it as an empirical hypothesis which we should provisionally accept. As an empirical hypothesis, it is not a transcendental constraint on knowledge, though it can be considered a transcendental feature (following Sacks’ (1997) distinction). That is, the thesis explains how knowledge is possible, but the epistemic status of the thesis itself is dependent on the course of experience. Here I explain how it is an empirical thesis and I explain the empirical considerations Peirce thinks support it. Though Peirce should not be considered a transcendental idealist in any robust sense, I give reasons for why he could still be considered a sort of absolute idealist. (shrink)

Short’s assertion that Peirce lacked a cohesive philosophical system is critically examined, and the interconnectedness of Peirce’s 1884–1893 “cosmology” with other aspects of his work is explored, countering Short’s claims of its limited systematic relevance. Additionally, Short’s claim that Peirce “expanded empiricism empirically” is scrutinized, and his interpretation of Peirce’s account of perception is criticized. By contrasting Short’s anti-system reading, I highlight the importance of studying Peirce’s philosophy holistically.

Quantum mechanics (QM) is a favorite area of physics to feature in “science and religion” discussions. We argue that this is at least partly because the arcane results of QM can be deployed to make big theological claims by the linguistic sleight of hand of “register switching”—sliding imperceptibly from technical into everyday language using the same vocabulary. We clarify the discussion by deploying the formal mapping of QM into classical statistical mechanics (CSM) via the mathematical device of “Wick rotation.” This (...) equivalence between QM and CSM suggests caution in claiming distinctiveness for quantum theologizing. After outlining two areas in which quantum insights nevertheless resonate with longstanding themes in theological reflection (hiddenness and visualizability), we suggest that both QM and CSM point to a theology of science in which scientists participate in the divine gaze on creation as imago Dei. (shrink)

Though P. G. Tait was in a seemingly perfect position to teach both William Thomson's thermodynamics and James Clerk Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light, he did not. Tait probably first encountered the new thermodynamics in the 1850s at Queen's College, Belfast, and presented the ideas in his inaugural lecture at Edinburgh in 1860, soon making energy theory the centre-piece of his course there. The comprehensiveness of energy theory plus Thomson's opposition to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory evidently combined in causing Tait to (...) de-emphasize Maxwell's theory. Ironically, Tait, the loyal Scot, thus inadvertently contributed to what might be termed the Anglicization of Scottish natural philosophy. (shrink)

Abstract:Peirce held a convergence theory of moral truth, as James Liszka persuasively argues in Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences (2021). Here I emphasize: (1) that Peirce's convergence theory follows from the application of the maxim of pragmatism to the concept of moral goodness or rightness; (2) that in connection with Peirce's account of the ethical summum bonum, morally right action can be understood as action that conforms or contributes to the growth of concrete reasonableness; and (3) (...) that, for Peirce, the growth of concrete reasonableness seems to be a movement or development toward "God". While I broadly agree with Liszka's approach, I highlight some disagreements. As do many readers of Peirce, Liszka seems to regard the convergence of beliefs and habits as necessarily a convergance among the "indefinite community" of distinct persons or inquirers; however, there is sufficient evidence that Peirce came to think that, if any given person were to live long enough, they would come to the same conclusions or rest in the same habits on their own. With respect to morality, even the most evil person would eventually come around to the moral truth. (shrink)

"Studies the path of natural philosophy (i.e., physics) from Isaac Newton through Scotland into the nineteenth-century background to the modern revolution in physics.

The sequencing of the human genome and decreasing costs of sequencing technology have led to the notion of ‘personalized medicine’. This has been taken by some authors to indicate that personalized medicine will provide individualized treatments solely based on one’s DNA sequence. We argue this is overly optimistic and misconstrues the notion of personalization. Such interpretations fail to account for economic, policy and structural constraints on the delivery of healthcare. Furthermore, notions of individualization based on genomic data potentially take us (...) down the road of genetic reductionism obscuring the role of environmental factors in disease and ill health. We propose that one should see personalized medicine as a way of using personal genomic information to stratify individuals into subpopulations and suggest that personalized medicine be seen within a broader idea of personalized healthcare, reflecting healthcare that integrates personal genomic data into cultural, environmental and personal contexts. (shrink)

A guide for scientists who would like to contribute to the professional development of science teachers for elementary schools. Based on information from over 180 programs, describes what activities work and why, and suggests how to identify programs teachers have found to be effective and take the initial steps to become involved. Also provides vignettes illustrating the daily work of science teachers. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The chapter focusses on the Scottish natural philosophy of the late eighteenth century represented by John Anderson (1726–1796) and John Robison (1739–1805), which is considered a link between Newton’s natural philosophy and nineteenth-century physics in Britain (Kelvin and Maxwell). Anderson and Robison have to be seen in a tradition of Scottish Newtonians established in the seventeenth century by David Gregory and John Keill and specifically shaped in the Mid-eighteenth century through the chemical-physical work of Joseph Black and the common-sense philosophy (...) of Thomas Reid. These latter Newtonians built on Newton’s theory of matter and short-range forces as indicated in Query 31 of his Opticks (Black) but also on his Rules of Reasoning of the second edition of his Principia (Black and Reid) and in this way created the theoretical framework in which Anderson and Robison developed their natural philosophy. In the center of their natural philosophy, which was oriented on experimental investigations, were the manifold open questions of the Baconian sciences of that time - theories of heat, light, electricity, magnetism as well as the understanding of the phlogiston. The chapter thus provides insight into the specific way in which the Newtonian camp participated in early modern natural philosophical speculations about minute particles of matter, fluids, or the propagation of light and heat. (shrink)

Introduction Recent years have seen increased interest in the complex relationships between the thought of German Idealists (understood to include both transcendental and absolute idealists) and the thought of those philosophers commonly categorized as “American Pragmatists” – from Charles S. Peirce (the progenitor of this alleged tradition) to Richard Rorty and his student, Robert Brandom. This issue presents a collection of papers that, as a collection, do justice to those complex relations...

Pregnancy has been traditionally defined as the period during which developing embryos are incubated in the body after egg–sperm union. Despite strong similarities between viviparity in mammals and other vertebrate groups, researchers have historically been reluctant to use the term pregnancy for non‐mammals in recognition of the highly developed form of viviparity in eutherians. Syngnathid fishes (seahorses and pipefishes) have a unique reproductive system, where the male incubates developing embryos in a specialized brooding structure in which they are aerated, osmoregulated, (...) protected and likely provisioned during their development. Recent insights into physiological, morphological and genetic changes associated with syngnathid reproduction provide compelling evidence that male incubation in these species is a highly specialized form of reproduction akin to other forms of viviparity. Here, we review these recent advances, highlighting similarities and differences between seahorse and mammalian pregnancy. Understanding the changes associated with the parallel evolution of male pregnancy in the two major syngnathid lineages will help to identify key innovations that facilitated the development of this unique form of reproduction and, through comparison with other forms of live bearing, may allow the identification of a common set of characteristics shared by all viviparous organisms. BioEssays 29:884–896, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Virtue theorists have recently been focusing on the important question of how virtues are developed, and doing so in a way that is informed by empirical research from psychology. However, almost all of this recent work has dealt exclusively with the moral virtues. In this paper, we present three empirically-informed accounts of how virtues can be developed, and we assess the merits of these accounts when applied specifically to intellectual (or epistemic) virtues.

Acceptance of Augustin Fresnel's wave theory of light posed numerous questions for early nineteenth-century physicists. Among the most pressing was the problem of the properties of the luminiferous ether. Fresnel had shown that light waves were transverse. Therefore, since, among ordinary materials, only solids support transverse vibrations, there existed striking likenesses between highly tangible solids and the highly intangible ether. Accordingly, such men as Augustin-Louis Cauchy, James MacCullagh, Franz Neumann, and George Green constructed various theories of an elastic-solid ether.1 At (...) the same time, however, the disconcerting implausibilities of an all-pervasive solid provoked considerable apprehension in regard to the elastic-solid tradition. Thomas Young found the concept ‘perfectly appalling’ and argued that ‘the hypothesis [that fluids can support transverse vibrations] remains completely open for discussion, notwithstanding the apparent difficulties attending it.’2 John Herschel, probably the most important English advocate of the wave theory, regarded the concept of a solid ether as only a temporary device, useful ‘till the real truth shall be discovered.’3 Consequently, despite the accomplishments which helped to make the elastic-solid theory ‘the most celebrated special form of the wave theory’,4 there were important voices of reservation. (shrink)